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I. INTRODUCTION
For certain types of contracts, the remedy for the breach of the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing has been found to lie in tort. Until
the Supreme Court's ruling in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,1 courts were
rapidly extending the application of the tort of bad faith breach of contract
into areas beyond the traditionally accepted realm of insurance contracts.2
Most significant for the purposes of this note was the expansion into the
area of health care services, specifically health maintenance organiza-
tions.3 Perhaps because of the chilling effect Pilot Life has had upon this
form of litigation,4 bad faith breach of contract has yet to be explored as
1481 U.S. 41 (1987).
2 See generally Michael Cohen, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1291 (1985); Leslie
John, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in the Borderland
of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033 (1986).3 Joanne Stearns, Bad Faith Suits: Are They Applicable to Health Maintenance
Organizations?, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 911 (1983).
4Although a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life concerning
the ERISA pre-emption of state statutory and common law actions is beyond the
scope of this note, some understanding of the case is necessary to appreciate the
recent loss of interest in the tort of bad faith breach of contract.
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a means of addressing a major health problem in the United States: the
plight of the nursing home resident. 5 In this note an attempt is made to
redefine the elements of the tort and examine the justification of extending
it to the nursing home contract, the disadvantages of current remedies
for the nursing home resident, and the advantages recognition of the tort
of bad faith breach of contract would afford the resident/plaintiff.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH BREACH OF CONTRACT
The notion that every contract contains within it an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is well established in American law.6 It can
be traced back to at least the turn of the century7 and has been codified
in several sources." Its application as a tort to expand the traditional rule
Application of the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 55 1001-1461, to common law bad faith and insurance
code claims has sharply limited the exposure of insurers to liability. ERISA covers
both employee funded pension plans and employee welfare benefit plans. It is the
latter, which include health care, disability and life insurance benefits, which
has most significantly affected bad faith actions.
ERISA provides that the remedies found in the statute supersede all state
laws. Federal courts have interpreted this as a pre-emption of all common law
and state statutory remedies. Pilot Life involved a plaintiffs tortuous breach of
contract claim against an insurance company's alleged bad faith denial of benefits
under an employer-provided policy. The Supreme Court held that the action,
regardless of the name attached to it, was pre-empted because the state law
involved "related to" an employment benefit plan. See generally Bishop & Denney,
Hello ERISA, Goodbye Bad Faith: Federal Pre-Emption ofDTPA, Insurance Code,
and Common Law Bad Faith Claims, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 267, 268-69 (1989).
Since very few employers offer plans which cover nursing homes, ERISA pre-
emption should have little or no effect on bad faith actions brought by nursing
home residents. Since most bad faith actions have been brought in the area of
insurance law, the pre-emption may have caused many litigators to ignore bad
faith breach of contract as a cause of action.
Abuse in both the living conditions in nursing homes and the business prac-
tices of the homes has been well documented by the federal government. The
substandard conditions include improper and unhygienic handling of food, laun-
dry, and medicines, filthy conditions in resident rooms, hallways, bathrooms and
kitchens, residents left unbathed despite incontinence, and inferior quality food.
Special Problems in Long-Term Health Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and Long Term Care of the Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1979). Improper business practices have included misappropriation of residents'
funds, undisclosed and arbitrary discharges of residents, inadequate protection
of residents' property, inadequate disclosures of charges, and the use of unfair
and deceptive contract provisions. Donna Meyers Ambrogi, Legal Issues in Nurs-
ing Home Admissions, 18 LAW. MED. & HEALTH CARE 254 (citing Taylor, Draft
Report: Unnamed Nursing Home Investigation (Seattle: Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 1981)).
Brown v. Superior Court, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (Cal. 1949).
For a good view of the historical development of the notion of a covenant of
good faith being found in every contract, see Charles M. Louderback & Thomas
J. Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16
U.S.F. L. REV. 187, 194 n. 34 (1982).
8 Id. at 190. Good faith and fair dealing have been incorporated into the Uni-
form Commercial Code, Uniform Sales Act, Robinson-Patman Act, and the Bank-
ruptcy Act, in addition to the Restatement 2d of Contracts.
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of Hadley v. Baxendale9 took root in insurance law. Through a series of
cases, the California Supreme Court held that for certain types of con-
tracts, the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was a
tort for which consequential and even punitive damages could be re-
covered. 1o
In the seminal case of Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,11 the court
held that an insurer's refusal to defend the insured in a third party suit
or accept a reasonable settlement was a breach of the implied covenant
to act in good faith present in every contract and was answerable in tort.
Despite this finding, the court used a contract remedy for damages.
Subsequently, in Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 12 the court distinguished
insurance contracts from ordinary commercial contracts by focusing on
the nature of the expectations of the insured. The court found it significant
that the insured party to an insurance contract seeks "peace of mind in
addition to commercial advantage. ' '13 This emphasis on the special quality
of the relationship between the insurer and the insured is reminiscent of
the breach of public duty that, at common law, the practitioners of "com-
mon callings"'14 were liable far beyond the extent of their contracts with
their clients. 5 In these cases, the practitioner, in holding himself out as
a purveyor of the particular calling, was charged with a public interest
by nature of his monopoly position in the field. A violation of this duty
was redressable in either contract or tort.16
This use of the bad faith breach of contract was extended by the same
court to cover refusals by insurers to honor payments to first-party in-
sureds in Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co.17 In Gruenberg, the court clearly
defined the extra-contractual nature of the bad faith breach of contract.
In speaking of the duty to deal in good faith, the court stated:
It is the obligation deemed to be imposed by law under which
the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its
contractual responsibilities. Where it fails ... such conduct
may give rise to a cause of action in tort for the breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.18
9Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rptr. 145 (1854). This rule limited the com-
pensatory damages available in contract to those which were foreseeable at the
time of the formation of the contract.
10 See Cohen, supra note 2, at 1326.
"328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
12 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
13d. at 179.
14 These "common callings" traditionally included the blacksmith, the food-
seller, the innkeeper, the common carrier, and the surgeon. See John, supra note
2, at 2044.1 For an indepth discussion of the history and development of the extra-con-
tractual duties of those dealing in services or products involved with the public
interest, see Charles K. Burdick, The Origins of the Peculiar Duties of Public
Service Companies, 11 COL. L. REv. 514 (1911).
16 See, John, supra note 2, at 2043-45.
17 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
is Id. at 1037. The plaintiff in Gruenberg claimed that the insurance company
wrongly accused him of arson to avoid paying for the destruction of his restaurant
by fire.
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The opinion goes on to state that the duty is non-consensual rather than
consensual.19
Applying this idea of the extra-contractual duty of the insurer, the
same court saw fit to extend the doctrine to allow for punitive damages
in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.20 In finding that the insurance
company's conduct merited punitive damages, the court stated "[i]n an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or
implied, the plaintiff, in addition to actual damages may recover damages
for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
2
'
Significantly, the court elucidated the public policy underlying its de-
cision in stating that the purpose of the use of punitive damages in such
a context was to discourage objectionable corporate practices. 22 The tort
of bad faith breach of contract can then be seen conceptually as a form
of corporate intentional tort, replete with punitive damages.
III. EXTENSION OF THE TORT TO THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
That the tort of bad faith breach of contract could be extended to the
health care industry was predicted by Stearns in her article Bad Faith
Suits: Are They Applicable to Health Maintenance Organizations?
23
Stearns draws the analogy between the HMO-member relationship and
the insurer-insured relationship. She emphasizes the dual nature of the
health maintenance organization ("HMO") as both insurer and provider
of care for the subscriber, thereby making the HMO liable both for the
refusal to administer benefits and the quality of the care received.
In her rationale for the application of the tort, Stearns points out a
number of features which characterize not only the HMO-subscriber and
insurer-insured relationship but the nursing home-resident relationship
as well. These cases are hallmarked by an inequality of bargaining power
in which the weaker party is presented with an adhesion contract and
cannot bargain over terms.2 4 This is especially the case for the nursing
home resident who is most likely both mentally and physically impaired25
and for whom available alternatives to the nursing home may be ex-
tremely limited.26 Stearns points out the need for the tort in such situ-
,9 Id. at 1038.
20 598 P.2d 452 (Cal. 1979), modified, 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
21 Id. at 457. In this case the court found that the insurance company had failed
to make a good faith effort to investigate the plaintiff's claim.
22 Id. at 487.
- See John, supra note 2, at 911.
241d. at 915.
Is Stiffelman v. Abrams, 655 S.W.2d 522, 529 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
26 A recent report by the General Accounting Office indicated that 40% of senior
citizens do not get needed care because of a shortage of nursing home beds.
Holbrook & Eramian, Eldercare Business; Financing, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan.
15, 1990 at 20.
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ations to insure that the weaker party can realize the benefit of his
bargain, especially where the contract is not made for commercial ad-
vantage but for "peace of mind and security".
2 7
The potential for emotional and physical suffering is much greater in
the HMO-subscriber relationship than in the insurer-insured relation-
ship. The HMO determines not only what care is covered but what care
is appropriate, who shall administer that care, when it will be admin-
istered, and the quality of the care. This is even more the case in the
nursing home-resident relationship where the resident is literally de-
pendent upon her nursing home, not only for her basic medical care (at
least in the case of skilled nursing facilities), but for all the necessities
(food, shelter, and even access to assistance for bodily elimination) of life.
The potential for corporate abuse which forms the rationale for the tort
in insurance cases is present a fortiori in both the nursing home and HMO
contracts.
Stearns also relies on the quasi-public nature of the services provided
by both the HMO and the insurance company.28 As noted in the previous
section, this forms one of the bases for the application of the tort and
relates back to the liability in tort at common law of the common callings.
She notes in this regard that health maintenance organizations are sub-
ject to even more public regulation than the insurance industry. Again,
the same reasoning applies to nursing homes which are the subject of
extensive state and federal regulation.
There is additional justification in support of the application of the tort
which is distinctly found in the nursing home and HMO setting. Because
of the control both organizations maintain over their members' access to
essential services, bad faith denials can result in emotional damages
which exceed those normally generated by the breach of a commercial
insurance contract. These types of emotional damages do not fit the con-
ventional negligence model, which is traditionally based upon pain and
suffering arising from a physical injury resulting from a specific act of
negligence.
Although at the time of Stearn's writing no bad faith breach of contract
suit against an HMO had reached the appellate stage,2 9 time bore out
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967).
"The insurers' obligations are ... rooted in their status as purveyors of a
vital service labeled quasi-public in nature. Suppliers of services affected with a
public interest must take the public's interest seriously, where necessary placing
it before their interest in maximizing gains and limiting disbursements.... [A]s
a supplier of a public service rather than a manufactured product the obligations
of an insurer go beyond meeting reasonable expectations of coverage." Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452, 457 (Cal. 1979) (citing Goodman &
Seaton, Foreword: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings & Current Concerns of
the California Supreme Court, 62 CAL. LL. REv. 309, 346-47 (1947)).
2 See John, supra note 23, at 914-15.
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Stearn's prediction. In Williams v. Healthamerica,30 the Ohio court of
appeals recognized the analogy between the insurance and the HMO
contract and held that the plaintiff had presented a cognizable form of
action under Ohio law for bad faith breach of contract. The court over-
turned a lower court decision that the plaintiff's claim was actually for
malpractice and upheld the validity of her claim that the HMO physician
violated her contract by denying her the health care benefits she was
promised through the HMO. In addition, the court, in analogizing to
insurance law, allowed the plaintiff to seek relief for emotional damages
under a bad faith breach of contract theory.
In Rederscheid v. Comprecare,31 the Colorado court of appeals found
that a bad faith breach of contract action against an HMO was valid
despite a Colorado statute which stated, "[T]he provisions of the insurance
law... shall not be applicable to any health maintenance organization."3 2
In so finding, the court held that "[bioth the tort of bad faith failure to
exercise due care in the discharge of a contractual duty and the granting
of damages for mental anguish caused by a willful and wanton breach of
contract are grounded in basic common law, and not solely in the area of
insurance law. '33 The court thus recognized the application of the tort
without resorting to the fiction that it was based solely on the HMO as
insurer.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 34 there has been a sharp decline in the litigation brought against
HMOs for bad faith breach of contract. As the vast majority of HMO
subscribers join through plans provided by an employer, their contracts
fall under the scope of ERISA. Since the primary advantage of bad faith
breach of contract as a cause of action is the availability of tort damages
including both damages for emotional distress and punitive damages,
both of which are excluded in a contract action under ERISA, interest in
the tort, especially in the area of health care, has understandably de-
clined.
3o 535 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio App. 1987). The plaintiff in this case was a member
of a health plan provided by the defendant HMO. The plaintiff alleged that she
had presented her primary care physician with a complaint of abdominal pain.
The physician treated her with a variety of medications to no avail. Despite her
repeated requests to be evaluated by an OB-GYN specialist, the physician refused
to grant her a referral. The plaintiff complained to the HMO administration that
she was being denied treatment that was due her but was informed that the
decision to refer was up to the primary physician. The physician continued to
treat her for one year without improvement in her condition when the plaintiff,
despite a refusal of approval from the HMO, was seen at a local emergency room
where a gynecologist diagnosed endometriosis. The plaintiff subsequently under-
went surgery and included in her suit against the HMO a claim for bad faith
breach of contract.
31667 P.2d 766 (Colo. 1983).
_12Id. at 767. (emphasis in original)
- Id.
481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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It may well be that the Supreme Court's holding represents a govern-
ment policy decision to protect employers and their insurers, especially
HMOs, from liability. This would protect employer-funded health insur-
ance and relieve some of the growing demand for socialized medicine.
However, no such policy concern exists for nursing homes. Rather, the
federal government has shown increasing concern over the lack of effec-
tive controls over nursing home quality in the face of well documented
nursing home abuse of residents.35
Although it is tempting to base extension of the tort of bad faith breach
of contract to the nursing home contract merely by analogy, it is essential
to determine distinct criteria which define those contracts to which the
tort can be applied and then determine if nursing home contracts conform
to those standards.
The most widely accepted criteria for the application of the tort was
elucidated by Louderback and Jurika in their article Standards for Lim-
iting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract.3 6 Louderback and Jurika
attempt to distill from the insurance cases, where the tort has been rec-
ognized, those aspects of the insurance contract which make the tort
applicable and thus serve as standards to which other types of contractual
relationships can be measured.3 7 That they succeeded in this attempt is
evidenced by the number of courts which have adopted their criteria as
a standard for application of the tort.38
"[In 1974] the United States Senate Special Subcommittee on Aging called
the system of long-term care for the elderly 'the most troubled and troublesome
component of our entire healthcare system.' The committee found that at least
half of the nation's nursing homes were substandard, due to the presence of life
threatening conditions. The committee also found that many patients received
inadequate health care, poor food, and were often subjected to unsanitary con-
ditions. The most startling finding was that nursing home patients frequently
suffer from neglect or are the targets of intentional abuse which sometimes results
in injury or death." Joyce D. Slocum, Comment, A Critical Analysis: The Patient
Abuse Provisions of the Missouri Omnibus Nursing Home Act, 24 ST. Louis U. L.
J. 713, 713-14 (1981) (citing THE SUBCOMM. ON LONG-TERM CARE, SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. ON AGING, NURSING HOME CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: FAILURE IN PUBLIC
POLICY, INTRODUCTORY REPORT, S. Rep. No. 93-1420, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 111
(1974), and citing STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LONG-TERM CARE, SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. ON AGING, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., - NURSING HOME CARE IN THE UNITED
STATES: FAILURE IN PUBLIC POLICY: SUPPORTING PAPER No. 1, THE LITANY OF
NURSING HoME ABUSES AND THE ROOTS OF THE CONTROVERSY 205 (Comm. Print
1074)).
' Louderback & Turica, supra note 7, at 194.
37 If anything, Louderback and Jurika's criteria have been criticized as too
restrictive in that they exclude most contracts other than insurance contracts.
See STEvE ASHLEY, BAD FAITH AcnoNs: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 11.03 (1986
and Supp. 1987). Nursing home contracts seem to fit, however, even judged by
these relatively strict standards.
- Alaska Assurance Co. v. Collins, 794 P.2d 936 (Ala. 1990); State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152 (Ala. 1989); Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Seamans Direct Buying Serv. Inc. v. Standard
Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984), rehearing denied Nov. 1984; Welch v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1988), as modified Jan. 1989; review
granted Mar. 1989; transferred Nov. 1989 to Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 4 with di-
1991-921
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Most notable amongst these cases is Seaman's Direct Buying Service v.
Standard Oil.A9 The court, relying on the standards set by Louderback
and Jurika, saw fit to extend the application of the tort to the realm of
commercial contracts. 40 Subsequently, based on the criteria outlined in
Seaman's, courts have extended the bad faith breach of contract tort to
the banking-depositor relationship 4' and the employer-employee rela-
tionship. 42
Louderback and Jurika identified four basic criteria common to those
insurance cases which have permitted the tort of bad faith breach of
contract:
1) [O]ne of the parties to the contract enjoys a superior bar-
gaining position to the extent that it is able to dictate the terms
of the contract; 2) the purpose of the weaker party in entering
into the contract is not primarily to profit but rather to secure
an essential service or product, financial security or peace of
mind; 3) the relationship of the parties is such that the weaker
party places its trust and confidence in the larger entity; 4)
there is conduct on the part of the defendant indicating an
intent to frustrate the weaker party's enjoyment of the contract
right.
43
The applicability of the first three criteria in the context of the nursing
home are not difficult to establish. Nursing home residents, usually weak
and debilitated to begin with, must often take any nursing home bed
available. Waiting periods of up to one year are not unusual. 44 Since the
rections to vacate its opp. and reconsider in light of Newman v. Emerson Radio
Corp., 772 P.2d 1059 (Cal. 1989), appellants Petition for review denied May 1990.;
Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138 (Colo. 1984); Ripsom v. Beaver
Blacktop Inc., 1988 Del.Supp. Lexis 117 (1988); Hettwer Farmer Ins. Co. of Idaho,
797 P.2d 81 (Idaho 1990); White v. Unigard Mutual Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014 (Idaho
1986).
39689 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).
40 Seaman's involved an agreement between a marine fuel dealership and an
oil supplier. Standard Oil submitted a letter of intent to Seaman's outlining their
agreement. When federal regulations subsequently limited oil supplies, Standard
Oil insisted that Seaman's obtain an exemption from the Federal Energy Office.
Seaman's obtained the exemption and Standard Oil appealed, convincing the
agency to revoke the exemption. Seaman's appealed the revocation and the agency
reissued the exemption subject to court determination that there existed a contract
between Seaman's and Standard Oil. Seaman's informed Standard Oil that unless
they agreed to stipulate to the existence of the contract, Seaman's would be forced
to discontinue operations. Standard Oil refused to so stipulate. Although on appeal
the California Supreme Court recognized the applicability of bad faith breach to
the contract, they reversed the lower court's finding because of a failure to instruct
the jury on the standards defining bad faith.
,1 Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
,2 Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
41 See Louderback & Jurika, supra note 37, at 227.
-RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 102-03 (3d ed. 1986).
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residents can no longer manage the simple activities of daily life and
usually have no one willing to care for them, they literally have no other
option. They have neither the economic nor mental leverage necessary
to bargain over contract terms. Once admitted they are totally dependant
on the largesse and good will of the nursing home for their subsistence.
45
The nursing home resident obviously does not enter into the nursing
home contract for purposes of commercial enrichment and has little choice
but to place her trust in the larger entity.
Interpretation of the fourth criteria as to what constitutes an "intent
to frustrate the weaker party's enjoyment of the contract rights"46 is more
difficult. Owen has delineated three mental states which suffice to support
punitive damages in this context: deliberate, evaluative and inadvert-
ent.47 Deliberate conduct will hinge upon the lack of a valid business
reason for the conduct. Evaluative conduct is seen where a party realizes
the probable results of its actions but, for business reasons, engages in
them anyway. Inadvertent action may exist where a party negligently or
consciously avoids the knowledge of the probable results of its actions.
While a nursing home may be guilty of any of the three states, the
most common (and easiest to prove) would be the latter two. John suggests
that:
in such cases, an award of punitive damages may be equally
appropriate when the institution has made a decision that fails
to comport with expectations of the public regarding a quasi-
public fiduciary. This is especially true.., when the institution
has adopted a policy which systematically fails to take the
rights of these individuals into account. 4
John modifies Owen's intents into an objective standard of "oppression,
which focuses on the actual abuse of bargaining power,"49 for corporate
defendants such as nursing homes.
This type of analysis reinforces the view of bad faith breach of contract
as a form of corporate intentional tort. What is surprising is the ease
with which the nursing home contract fits the above criteria. The vast
amount of scrutiny of bad faith breach of contract, both by courts and
writers, has been in its application to commercial settings and its validity
as an alternative to traditional contract damages; i.e., imposing an extra-
contractual tort duty upon what had been traditionally viewed as solely
a contractual relationship.
41 "Residents of nursing homes are literally captive and at the mercy of the
institutions wherein they reside; unless they can move to another facility - not
always possible with current bed shortages and lack of relatives or friends to
assist." Patricia A. Butler, A Long Term Health Care Strategy for Legal Services,
14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 613, 641 (1980).
4 See supra note 42.47 David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
103, 106 (1982).
Leslie E. John, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in
the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REv. 2033, 2058-59 (1984).
49 Id.
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The nursing home contract, as is the case with the HMO contract, is,
however, less of a commercial contract than the insurance contract, the
standard against which other contracts have been measured. Further,
the majority of suits brought against nursing homes by residents have
not been in contract but in negligence.5 0 Many courts have viewed nursing
home resident suits as variations of the medical malpractice model re-
quiring expert testimony as to nursing practices and community stand-
ards of medical care.5'
Bad faith breach in the context of the nursing home resident relation-
ship must be seen then as an alternative to a negligence model rather
than as a contract model. Bad faith breach arises from an amalgam of
contract theory and tort theory, much the same as strict product liability.
Such an amalgam theory has been applied where the traditional theories
fail to conform to economic or social reality.52 Problems with adequacy of
recovery (failure to make the plaintiff whole), and difficulties of proof,
combined with some sense of violation of the public good seem to justify
a form of action which combines the most advantageous aspects of both
contract and tort. The underlying rationale for bad faith breach thus
differs little from that offered by Justice Traynor in explanation for the
creation of strict product liability,53 with its merging of tort damages and
strict warranty liability. A blending of tort and contract theory may better
address certain problems which are inadequately addressed by either
theory alone.
IV. Is A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION NECESSARY?
A. Negligence
Despite the well documented, widespread abuse which has been found
in nursing homes, the majority of cases which have been brought by
nursing home residents have been based in negligence, usually involving
a fall.54 The comparison which must be made then is between negligence
and bad faith breach as remedies for the nursing home patient. This
involves an examination of the barriers which have arisen for nursing
home residents in pursuing negligence actions.
Not unlike Aristotle's dramatic unities, the paradigm of a negligence
action involves the unities of person and event; i.e., the ideal negligence
suit involves the single negligent action of one person which results in
injury to another person.55 In order to conform to economic realities, the
I See Butler, supra note 45, at 641.
51 See Butler, supra note 45, at 642.
52 See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
' See Butler, supra note 45, at 641.
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law has had to adopt the fiction of respondeat superior to expand the
unity of person, thus extending liability to a party better able to absorb
the cost. Unity of event, however, is still the rule in negligence law.
Negligence actions are best suited to incidents where a specific act of
negligence can be identified, and damages can be easily calculated by
comparing the state of the injured party before and after the event.
The negligence model is unsatisfactory in the nursing home context
because it does not focus upon the wrongs actually committed and their
resultant harm. The typical nursing home negligence action selects out
a particular event, such as a fall, in which the nursing home is charged
with negligence and from which duty, breach, causation and damages
must be proven. This type of action ignores the pattern of behavior of the
defendant and the accumulation of practices, one of which may not have
alone caused the particular damage, but taken together result in abuse.
The failure of negligence actions to remedy the plight of the nursing home
resident can be better understood by individually examining the elements
of negligence in the context of the nursing home plaintiff.
Since, in relying upon a negligence action, the plaintiff must usually
focus upon a particular event, the standard of care must relate to that
event. Nursing homes have been generally acknowledged to owe a duty
of reasonable care to avoid foreseeable injury, which must include rec-
ognition of a resident's age and mental and physical condition as it is
known or reasonably should be known by the facility.56 The definition of
what this standard consists of has posed more of a problem. As stated,
many courts adopt a medical malpractice model for nursing home neg-
ligence suits. This requires expert testimony to establish standards and
a look to the local standard of care in other nursing homes, which itself
may be abysmally low, to determine the specifics of the standard.57 While
state and federal certification and licensing regulations, when sufficiently
specific, have on occasion been used to establish a standard of care,5
courts have often refused to use the statutes as defining reasonable care.5 9
Examples of such "ideal" negligence cases can usually be found in tort case
books. One such case is Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 467, 132 Eng. Rptr.
490 (1837), appearing in W. PROSSER, J. WADE, V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 149 (1988). In Vaughn, the plaintiff negligently built a hayrick which
caught on fire and damaged his neighbor's property.
Garner v. Crawford, 288 So.2d 886 (La. App. 1973); Brown v. University
Nursing Home, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. App. 1972); Moore v. Halifax Hosp.
Dist., 202 S.E.2d 568 (Ga. App. 1967); Bezark v. Kostner Manor, Inc., 172 N.E.2d
424 (Ill. App. 1961).
57 See Butler, supra note 45, at 643.
58Dusine v. Golden Shores Convalescent Center, Inc., 249 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App.
1971).
59 'The Nursing Homes Patient's Bill of Rights does not set the standard to
which nursing homes are held accountable in negligence damages actions. Such
a holding would ignore the purpose of the negligence per se doctrine and the
malpractice law of this state. It would permit the trier of fact to set its own
standard of care for health providers and speculate virtually without limits on
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One reason for this apparent reluctance on the part of courts lies in the
underlying theory of a negligence action. The standard of care is theo-
retically an objective standard favoring neither party. Thus, unless a
regulation specifically addresses the circumstance at hand, the court is
not really justified in interpreting what may be a vague statute in favor
of the plaintiff just because he may be in an inferior economic or social
position.
Causation has also proven to be a problem for the nursing home resi-
dent/plaintiff. Given an elderly, frail resident with multiple medical prob-
lems and diminished mental capacity,60 it may be difficult to place the
blame for any worsening of the residents' condition on any particular act
of the nursing home, especially considering the natural history of most
diseases of the elderly. In addition, the resident's impaired condition pre-
disposes her to accidents which could easily be explained without nec-
essarily involving negligence on the part of the nursing home. Unfor-
tunately, nursing home residents, whose mental states are often impaired,
seldom make reliable witnesses.
Damages in those negligence actions which have been successful have
been small.6 ' This reflects our system for measuring damage in negligence
actions. Nursing home residents have little capacity for future earnings
and very short life expectancy. Their pre-existing conditions make it
difficult to determine just how much they have been injured.
Negligence law typically excludes punitive damages. A defendant's
conduct is assumed to be accidental in nature, regardless of whether the
result was assured by some conscious policy decision. A nursing home's
transfer policy, which may purposely reflect its own economic interest
and result in transfer trauma 2 to the resident, may be addressed no
differently using negligence than a simple fall. The further the situation
deviates from the ideal negligence model, the more inadequately negli-
gence serves as a remedy.
the culpability of their conduct." Case Notes of Chap. 131E, Health Care Facilities
and Services., Art. 6 Health Care Facilities Licensure Act, Legislative Intent, N.C.
GEN. STATS. § 131E-115 (citing Makas v. Hillhaven, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 736
(M.D.N.C. 1984)); see also Laurie v. Patton Home for the Friendless, 516 P.2d 76
(Or. 1973), holding that ordinance requiring sufficient number of staff merely
restated common law duty of reasonable care.
10 Friedman v. Division of Health, 537 S.W.2d 547, 548-49 (Mo. 1976).
61 See Butler, supra note 45, at 642. Damages have generally ranged between
$2,000 and $40,000.
62 Transfer trauma is the deterioration noted in a resident's physical and men-
tal status following transfer from surroundings in which he has become accus-
tomed to a new environment either in another facility or in a different section of
the same facility. Transfer trauma can result in the resident's death and almost
always at least results in severe depression or regressive behavior. See O'Bannion
v. Town Court Nursing Center: Patients Rights to Participate in Nursing Home
Decertification, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 469, 481-82 (1981). Provisions limiting the
involuntary transfer of residents have been included in the federal nursing home
Bill of Rights. 42 C.F.R. § 4051121 (k)4.
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B. Contract
The main limitation of actions for breach of contract has been the
question of damages. Contract damages follow the traditional rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale. 3 This rule limits the damages available for breach
of contract to those damages within the reasonable contemplation of the
parties at the time of the formation of the contract.4 As Calamari 5 points
out, this rule was based upon protection for developing commercial en-
terprises and dovetails very well with the Holmesian idea of efficient
breach. Its failure in the non-commercial setting, such as in the nursing
home-resident relationship, to make the aggrieved party whole has lim-
ited its usefulness. The separate question of construing the terms of the
nursing home contract will be taken up in a later section.
C. State Regulation
In recent years a number of states have passed statutes regulating
nursing homes and incorporating into these regulations a so-called Nurs-
ing Home Resident's Bill of Rights which guarantees to the resident
protection against certain violations by the nursing home. Currently, at
least twenty states have enacted statutes which create a private right of
action for the nursing home resident to enforce the regulations.6 6 Perhaps
the most far reaching of these are the New York and West Virginia
statutes which allow for private rights of action and permit recovery of
both compensatory and punitive damages to the resident.
While these laws are all laudable in their efforts to reform nursing
home abuse, the problem lies in the remedy available to the resident.
There is great variability in the types of remedies offered by these stat-
utes. Under the North Carolina statute, the private relief afforded the
resident is limited to injunctive relief.6 7 The Missouri statute, while set-
156 Eng. Rptr. 145 (1854).
"Id. at 151.
J. CALAMA I & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14.5, at 594 (1987).
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 430(b) (West Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STATS.
ANN. § 19a-550(b) (Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1309 (Supp. 1985); FLA.
STATS ANN. §§ 400.023 & 400.429 (Harrison 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-126
(1985); HAWAn REV. SWAT. § 657-73 (Supp. 1984); ILL ANN. SWAT. Chap. 111 1/2,
§ 4153-601 (Smith-Hurd Supp 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2 20 (Burns 1984);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111 § 70E (1983); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 333.21772 (Cal-
lagan 1980); Mo. ANN. STATS. § 198.093 (Vernon 1983); N.H. REV. STATS. ANN. §
151:30 (Supp. 1983); N.J. REV. STATS. ANN. § 30:13-8 (1981); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2801-d (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STATS. § 130-272 (1981); OHiO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3721.17(1), 3721.19 (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1984); OKLA. STATS. tit 63§ 1-1918(f) & § 1-1939 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.51.208 (1978); W.VA.
CODE § 16-5C-15 (1984); Wisc. STATS. ANN. § 50.10 & 50.11 (West Supp. 1984).
67 "The patient shall have the right to institute a civil action for injunctive
relief to enforce the provisions of this part." N.C. GEN STATS. § 131E-123 (1981).
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ting forth detailed regulations for nursing homes, permits civil actions
for enforcement only when the attorney general has failed to act.68
Nursing home residents are not typical plaintiffs. Dependent as they
are on the nursing home, they can ill afford either defeat or Pyrrhic
victory. Given the difficulties with proof and damages in traditional tort
and contract remedies, there is little incentive for a resident to sue.6 9 On
the other hand, a nursing home resident may have very justified fears of
retaliation on the part of the nursing home. Even without retaliation,
residents whose nursing home loses its license for violations of state
regulations may find themselves in a worse situation than before. Given
the limited bedspace available, a resident may find herself with nowhere
to go.
In order to meet the needs of nursing home residents, a remedy, if
successful, must compensate residents for the harm done and insure that
they are placed in a financially secure position to find other acceptable
accommodations. Another sad fact of life in the nursing home legal picture
is the reluctance of attorneys to take on nursing home patients in the
face of current damage constraints. The availability of punitive damages
would do much to encourage this area of litigation.
Leaving the solution of nursing home abuse to the state legislatures
also raises political problems. Nursing home residents as a group lack
political power. They tend not to vote and they lack political organiza-
tion.70 In contrast, nursing home political action committees contribute
heavily to candidates and have been successful in many states in diluting
or entirely blocking nursing home Bill of Rights statutes.7'1
D. Federal Regulation
In 1974, Congress approved the Nursing Home Bill of Rights7 as part
of the conditions of participation for nursing homes accepting medicare
and medicaid funds. In 1976, these regulations were extended to include
- It should be noted, however, that in Stiffelman v. Abrams, 655 S.W.2d 522
(Mo. 1983), the Missouri Supreme Court held that the statute did establish the
standard of care in a negligence action. A similar conclusion was reached by
Wisconsin Supreme Court in finding that the statute defined the standard of care.
Kuiawski v. Arbor View Health Care Center, 407 N.W.2d 249 (Wisc. 1987).
69 See Butler, supra note 45, at 622. Despite the well documented extensive
level of abuse present in nursing homes, suits brought by residents have been
very few. From 1950 to 1978, only 35 personal injury cases were filed by nursing
home residents against their nursing homes.
70 Cathrael Kazin, Nowhere To Go and Choose To Stay: Using the Tort of False
Imprisonment to Redress Involuntary Confinement of the Elderly in Nursing
Homes and Hospitals, 137 U. PENN L. REv. 903, 919 (1989).
71 McMath, The Nursing Home Maltreatment Case, 21 TRIAL 50, at 52-53 n. 3,
Sept. 1985.
72 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121 (1990). The section is divided into subsections dealing
with the financial, administrative and medical management of the nursing home.
The subsection of particular interest is (k) Patients' Rights. This section has served
as a model for a number of state resident rights statutes and states
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intermediate care facilities as well as skilled nursing facilities. Each
participating nursing home is required to have written policies which
guarantee to each resident certain rights in the areas of privacy, freedom
from restraint, and individual autonomy. More recently, these regulations
were expanded and made more specific in an attempt to better safeguard
the rights of the residents.
73
These patients rights policies and procedures ensure that, at least, each
patient admitted to the facility: 1) Is fully informed, as evidenced by the
patient's written acknowledgement, prior to or at the time of admission and
during stay, of these rights and of all rules and regulations governing patient
conduct and responsibilities; 2) Is fully informed prior to or at the time of
admission and during stay, of services available in the facility and of related
charges including any charges for services not covered under any titles
XVIII or XIX of the Social Security Act, or not covered by the facility's basic
per diem rate; 3) Is fully informed by a physician of his medical condition
unless medically contraindicated (as documented by a physician in his med-
ical record), and is afforded the opportunity to participate in the planning
of his medical treatment and to refuse to participate in experimental re-
search; 4) Is transferred or discharged only for medical reasons, or for his
welfare or that of other patients, or for nonpayment of his stay (except as
prohibited by titles XVIII or XIX of the Social Security Act), and is given
notice to ensure orderly transfer or discharge, and such actions are docu-
mented in his medical record; 5) Is encouraged and assisted throughout his
period of stay, to exercise his rights as a patient and as a citizen, and to
this end may voice grievances and recommend changes in policies and serv-
ices to facility staff and/or to outside representatives of his choice, free from
restraint, interference, coercion, discrimination, or reprisal; 6) May manage
his personal financial affairs, or is given at least a quarterly accounting of
financial transactions made on his behalf should the facility accept his
written declaration of this responsibility to the facility for any period of
time in conformance with state law; 7) Is free from mental and physical
abuse, and free from chemical and (except in emergencies) physical re-
straints except as authorized in writing by a physician for a specified and
limited period of time, or when necessary to protect the patient from injury
to himself or others; 8) Is assured confidential treatment of his personal
and medical records, and may approve or refuse their release to any indi-
vidual outside the facility, except, in case of his transfer to another health
care institution, or as required by law or third-party payment contract; 9)
Is treated with consideration, respect, and full recognition of his dignity
and individuality, including privacy in treatment and in care for his per-
sonal needs; 10)Is not required to perform services for the facility that are
not included for therapeutic purposes in his plan of care; 11) May associate
and communicate privately with persons of his choice, and send and receive
his personal mail unopened, unless medically contraindicated (as docu-
mented by his physician in his medical record); 12) May meet with, and
participate in activities of social, religious, and community groups at his
discretion, unless medically contraindicated (as documented by his physi-
cian in his medical record); 13) May retain and use his personal clothing
and possessions as space permits, unless to do so would infringe upon the
rights of other patients, and unless medically contraindicated (as docu-
mented by his physician in his medical record); 14) If married, is assured
privacy for visits by his/her spouse; if both are inpatients in the facility,
they are permitted to share a room unless medically contraindicated (as
documented by the attending physician in the medical record).
' In February, 1989, the Health Care Financing Administration published the
final revisions of the nursing home regulations passed in the 1987 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act. These regulations contained significant expansions of
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This expansion reflects a dissatisfaction on the part of Congress with
the effectiveness of the enforcement of the regulations by the Department
of Health and Human Services.7 4 The federal regulations are enforced
through the state health departments under an agreement with the fed-
eral government. Penalties for violations can range from delicensure and
loss of certification to participate in medicare or medicaid to civil fines
and admissions restrictions.7 5 The individual resident has no power to
initiate any of the sanction proceedings.76
The effectiveness of these regulations depends on the level of enforce-
ment by the state, which may vary considerably. Nursing home residents
have attempted to enforce these regulations by securing private rights
of action under the federal regulations. Unfortunately, their efforts have
met with little success.
In Blum v. Yaretsky,77 medicaid residents in a nursing home brought
a class action suit challenging the home's decision to discharge them. The
plaintiffs claimed that the decisions were dictated by federal regulations
and therefore qualified as state action. Since the discharges were carried
out without proper notice, the plaintiff's claimed their due process rights
under the fourteenth amendment had been violated. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority held, however, that the decisions were made by
private nursing homes based upon their independent medical judgments.
Their actions were not encompassed, therefore, by the state action doc-
trine.
In Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc. 78 a medicaid patient sued a nursing home
for violation of the federal nursing home regulations involving invol-
residents' rights in the following areas: maintaining confidentiality of personal
and clinical records; guaranteeing facility access and visitation rights issuing a
notice of rights at the time of admission; implementing admission policy require-
ments; assuring proper use of physical restraints and psychoactive drugs; pro-
tecting resident funds from being managed by a facility; ensuring transfer and
discharge rights, and issuing notices required of a facility; providing 24 hour
licensed nursing services, and services of a registered nurse at least eight hours
a day, seven days a week, subject to waiver; furnishing comprehensive assess-
ments and being subject to civil monetary penalties for falsification of assessment;
requiring minimum training of nurses' aides, competency evaluation programs,
and regular inservice education; prohibiting admission to SNFs and NFs of in-
dividuals with mental illnesses and mental retardation, except when they need
SNF and NF services and have been pre-screened by a state authority of mental
illness or retardation; providing or obtaining routine and emergency dental serv-
ices; employing a full-time social worker if a facility has more than 120 beds; and
meeting disclosure requirements. 54 Fed. Reg. 5316 (1989).
74Special Committee on Aging. U.S. Senate, Hearing on Nursing Home Survey
And Certification: Assuring Quality of Care, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 15, 1982).
75As Butler, supra note 51, at 650-51, has pointed out, the delicensure procedure
is cumbersome and rarely used, and fines are available only in certain delineated
situations.
76 Id. at 651.
77457 U.S. 991 (1982).
78 461 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
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untary transfer. Applying the Cort test, 7 the court held that the federal
regulations did not create a private right of action and the plaintiff there-
fore could not maintain a claim based upon the regulations themselves.80
The federal district court in Robertson v. Wood distinguished Fuzie
despite an almost identical fact pattern, holding that the federal regu-
lations did create a private cause of action for the resident. This decision,
however, has not been followed. In Wagner v. Sheltz81 and again in Chalfin
v. Beverly Enterprises,2 federal district courts have affirmed the holding
in Fuzie that no private right of action is created.
E. Other Theories of Liability
The liability of nursing homes to their residents has been found under
a variety of theories. Although numbers have been limited, residents have
successfully pursued claims based on battery, assault, conversion, false
imprisonment,83 and violation of state unfair trade laws. 4 The intentional
tort remedies have usually been reserved for the most egregious abuses
or have been limited in scope. Theories based on unfair trade laws have
been successful in a number of cases8 but, in general, remedies are limited
by the damages available and the inconsistencies between the various
state statutes. 6 In addition, some consumer protection laws specifically
exclude claims for death or personal injury. 7
79 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the Supreme Court elucidated the
test to determine whether a plaintiff has a private right of action under a federal
law. The Cort test is composed of four questions: Was the act intended especially
to benefit the plaintiff? Does any legislative pronouncement explicitly or implic-
itly suggest the intent to create or deny a private cause of action? Is it consistent
with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply a cause of action?
Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law? Id. at 78.
464 F.Supp 983 (E.D. 111. 1979). In Fuzie, the court did however determine
that the plaintiff could maintain a claim for breach of contract based upon the
federal regulations as an intended third party beneficiary of the contract between
the state and the nursing home. This portion of the holding will be discussed in
a later section.
1 471 F. Supp. 903 (Conn. 1979).
82 741 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Penn. 1989).
- The use of the tort of false imprisonment in the nursing home context was
explored in Cathrael Kazin Nowhere to Go and Choose to Stay: Using the Tort of
False Imprisonment to Redress Involuntary Confinement of the Elderly in Nursing
Homes and Hospitals, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1989). While this might indeed be
a viable alternative in certain cases, the need to prove a specific fact pattern
limits the utility of the tort.
These cases have been based on consumer protection laws found in every
state. While most of these laws are directed against specific activities, most also
contain general language prohibiting deceptive practices. It is this language
which most often serves as a basis for nursing home residents' suits. Diane Hor-
vath & Patricia Nemore, Nursing Home Abuses as Unfair Trade Practices, 20
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 801, 802 (Nov. 1986).
Id. at 804-05.
A majority of states exempt regulated practices which would likely include
a nursing home's regulations. Statutes in twenty-six states limit private litigants
to injunctive relief while the damage amounts allowed, even under the more
liberal laws, range between $25 and $2000.
SSee, e.g., Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.12(C) (Baldwin 1991).
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V. BAD FAITH BREACH OF CONTRACT
In order to make bad faith breach of contract a workable vehicle for
the nursing home resident/plaintiff, an attempt must be made to better
define the elements of the tort; a task which has sometimes alluded the
courts which have addressed it. As we have stated, this action is a form
of corporate intentional tort which combines the most advantageous (for
the plaintiff) aspects of contract and tort theories. There must, however,
be limits set on its application to distinguish it from a simple breach of
contract and a true act of negligence so that every breach of contract is
not converted into a tort action or every accident into a breach of contract.
Combining the standards of Jurika and Louderback 8 with those of Owen89
and John,9° the applicability of the tort would seem to depend on three
factors: the nature of the contract, the nature of the relationship between
the parties, and the conduct of the defendant. More specifically, the plain-
tiff would have to prove that: 1) the contract was one made for reasons
other than commercial gain;9 1 2) there is an inequality between the parties
such that the weaker party is forced to rely upon the good faith of the
stronger party in order to enjoy the benefits of the contract; and 3) the
conduct of the stronger party is such that it reflects the adoption of a
policy which systematically fails to meet the justified expectations of the
weaker party.
The first two elements would serve to distinguish between those con-
tracts subject to the tort of bad faith breach from those subject to an
ordinary contract action. The first element singles out the subject matter
of the contracts covered. The second element incorporates both the notion
of "special relationship" and the idea of quasi-public service and expands
the traditional focus on inequality of bargaining power in the formation
stage to include inequality in the performance stage.
The third element serves both to distinguish the tort from negligence
and to justify punitive damages. It requires the demonstration of some
pattern of behavior, either as a result of corporate inadvertence (not
realizing what they should do) or evaluation (realizing but acting any-
way). In addition, intentional actions would also be included. This ele-
ment, however, would also take into account that isolated acts of negli-
gence can occur even within a nursing home environment without in-
dicating abuse. Not every act that results in some harm is a bad faith
breach of contract. However, focusing on aggregate behavior rather than
See supra note 36.
Owen, supra note 47.
John, supra note 48.
91 This does not necessarily exclude commercial contracts. In Wallis v. Superior
Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984), the court upheld a bad faith breach of contract
action based on the employer-employee relationship. While the purpose of working
is certainly financial gain, other factors enter into the relationship to make it
more than a means of commercial gain.
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single incidents would relax the demands inherent in a negligence action
to prove that all damages stem from a single negligent incident. Thus,
cumulative damage from a pattern of behavior could be considered along
with justification for the punishment of that behavior.
VI. TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
A. The Nursing Home Contract
The first problem to arise using these elements would be; What con-
stitutes the justified expectation of the weaker party? As the action is
based upon breach of contract, the simple answer would be the terms of
the contract. Nursing home contracts rarely include express terms guar-
anteeing quality care or patients' rights.9 2 They are, however, generous
with exculpatory clauses, waivers of liability for the nursing home, and
limitations on resident rights.93 Reliance, therefore, on the express terms
of the nursing home contract will often be futile.
c Some plaintiffs have advanced the argument that the contracts have
included an implied promise to provide reasonable care. While courts
have accepted this reasoning, they have found the promise to do no more
than set the same standard of care which would be applied in a tort case.9 4
In contrast, however, some courts95 have taken an expansive view of even
vaguely written terms of a nursing home contract holding that contracts
entered into by persons "in their declining years" 6 should be liberally
construed in favor of the elderly. Thus, even vague terms may serve as
the basis of a cause of action.
92 Lutler, supra note 51, at 642.
13 Donna Myers Ambrogi, Legal Issues in Nursing Home Admissions, 18 LAw
MED. & HEALTH CARE 254,257 (Fall 1990). As Ambrogi points out, nursing homes
will often incorporate unconscionable, if not illegal terms, into their contracts
relying on the residents' ignorance or helplessness. Such terms include waivers
of liability for negligence, extra charges for services already covered in the basic
fee, requirements for co-signers, solicitations of contributions, restrictions on vis-
itation and requirements that residents commit to a specific length of stay before
converting to Medicaid, to name but a few.
" Brown v. University Nursing Homes, 496 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. App. 1972). It
should be noted that Brown involved a negligence situation where a resident fell
as a result of a faulty restraining table. The plaintiff here was suing both in
negligence and breach of contract and proposing that under a contract theory the
nursing home had some absolute liability to the plaintiff. While the court properly
rejected this 'argument, care must be taken not to over read this case.
15 Hutchins v. Bethel Methodist Home, 370 F. Supp 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In
this case, a primarily residential home transferred a patient to another, higher
level care facility (with the resident paying the difference in rate). The resident
claimed that the clause in her contract in which the nursing home agreed to pay
"all necessary medical services" required the home to absorb the additional cost.
The court agreed.9Id. at 963.
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In addition to the dearth of express guarantees to the resident, nursing
home contracts usually contain merger clauses to exclude any outside
material from the contract. These clauses, especially when included in
consumer contracts, have frequently been found to have no effect except
where it can be demonstrated that they have truly been agreed to9 (a
condition particularly unlikely in a nursing home contract). If a home is
a participant in medicare or medicaid and has complied with the federal
regulations requiring written policies to implement the federal nursing
home Bill of Rights, it is very possible that these written policies could
be introduced as having been incorporated as terms of the contract under
the parol evidence rule.
9 8
B. Advertisement
Nursing homes in the United States are big business. In 1980 there
were 26,000 nursing homes in this country which housed 1.3 million
people.9 9 The number is assuredly larger now. What was once a business
run by sole proprietorships is now dominated by large corporate chains.
With this change in the complexion of the marketplace has come increas-
ing competition and the need for marketing strategies including adver-
tising. Recently one major nursing home chain has resorted to television
advertisements. 100 This new trend may provide fertile ground for nursing
home plaintiffs to expand on the lack of express terms in their contracts.
Sellers have long been held to promises made in promotional litera-
ture.10 ' An argument can certainly be made that the contract incorporates
the promises made in a brochure designed to induce reliance and that
these promises can be taken as express warranties. Such promises often
encompass both the quality and quantity of care offered. 0 2 In addition,
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216, Comment e (1979).
18 Even under the more restrictive Willistonian rule, a set of written policies
would likely be viewed as consistent additional terms which should be included.
Lawrence R. Leonard, The Ties That Bind: Life Care Contracts and Nursing
Homes, 8 AM. J. L. & MED. 153 (Summer 1982).
"0 Manor Care Nursing Home, Inc., one of the largest of the nursing home
chains, began airing television commercials in January 1991 in the Cleveland
area to test audience response to the advertising of nursing home care. The ads
are directed at assuaging the guilt associated with placing a family member in
a nursing home. Elisa Williams, Manor Care Ads Irk Shareholders, THE WASH-
INGTON TIMES, Sept. 6, 1990, at C1.
101 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932).
102 The following were selected from a sampling of promotional literature from
nursing homes in the Cleveland area:
"[Olpen door policy regarding counseling personal concerns, financial or oth-
erwise." "Everything smells clean with an aroma of fresh brewed coffee and
homemade apple pies in the oven." "Daily - Three nutritious meals, snacks and/
or nourishment planned by our registered dietician. 24 hour - Personal attentive
care and grooming by our trained Nursing Assistants. 24 hour Professional and
licensed nurses providing guarded and watchful care of your needs and comfort.
Clean changes of bedding and linens bi-weekly and as needed daily. Daily house-
keeping laundry." Brochure, Mount Royal Villa Care Center, North Royalton,
Ohio.
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many nursing homes advertise themselves as being medicare and/or med-
icaid certified. 0 3 This could be seen as implying that they meet the federal
regulations for approval, thus incorporating the nursing home bill of
rights into the contract.
Combining promotional literature with the rules that ambiguous lan-
guage is to be interpreted against the drafter 0 4 and that an interpretation
in favor of the public good should be favored'0 5 could result in an effective
weapon in a bad faith breach of contract suit.
C. State Statutes
As has been mentioned, many states have adopted nursing home res-
ident's Bill of Rights statutes. These statutes, however, often afford lim-
ited or no private rights of action. Some commentators have suggested
that the state's nursing home regulations could be considered as incor-
porated into the contract under the rule that the laws of the state are
considered part of every contract. 106 An excellent analysis of this theory
has been done by Regan. 0 7 He first notes the contractual nature of the
"[M]eets or exceeds all applicable legal regulatory, professional, and program-
matic requirements." "Each resident's individuality and dignity are cherished
and maintained in a context of the highest standards of professional care." Bro-
chure, Pleasant Lake Villa, Parma, Ohio.
"We provide the emotional and physiological support to preserve and maintain
the personal dignity of each and every resident." "24 hour nursing care." "Nu-
tritional and delicious meals for regular or special diets." "Daily housekeeping
and linens." "[F]lexible visiting hours." Our certified activities director plans a
variety of social, religious, physical and intellectual programs." Brochure, Aris-
tocrat Berea, Berea, Ohio.
"Day, evening and weekend activities." "Resident bathing is made comfortable
and secure by using the latest techniques and bathing equipment." "[A] warm
home like setting." "Licensed nurses are on duty 24 hours a day." "[G]ood food in
the cheerful dining room." "Comprehensive therapy programs include physical
therapy, occupational therapy, and recreational therapy." Brochure, Alpha Health
Care Center, Middleburg Heights, Ohio.
"We provide a total healthcare program tailored to the individual needs of our
residents." "The facility provides a full range of rehabilitative services ... pro-
vided under the direction of a licensed therapist." "The facility maintains a varied
recreation program." "There are no special visiting hours so family and friends
may drop in any time." Brochure, Southwest Health Care Center, Middleburg
Heights, Ohio.
'o' CLEVELAND CONSUMER YELLOW PAGES, 1990-91, at 906-14.
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979).
106 Id. at § 207. This relates back to an idea developed earlier that providing
nursing home services is a quasi-public function.
106 See Butler, supra note 54, at 643; see also MaryAnne Meyers, New Hope for
Quality Care for the Aged in Oregon's Long Term Care Facilities, 18 WILLAMETrE
L. REV. 135, 149 (1982).
117 John J. Regan, When Nursing Home Patients Complain: The Ombudsman
or the Patient Advocate, 65 GEO. L. J. 691, 713-14 (1977).
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nursing home-resident relationship, even in the absence of a written
contract which would contain an implied warranty of adequate care and
treatment. He than analogizes to the landlord-tenant relationship in
which the implied warranty of habitability has been held to incorporate
the local housing and building codes. Such an analysis results in a con-
tract whose measure would be the nursing home's compliance with all
state and possibly federal regulations, including the Nursing Home Res-
idents' Bill of Rights.108
There is little case law directly on this point. One case that does mention
it suggests by implication that the state's regulations are implicitly in-
corporated. In Truesdell v. Proctor,0 9 the plaintiff argued that the state
nursing home regulations were included in the contract by virtue of the
rule that state laws are an implicit part of every contract. The court
appeared to recognize the reasoning but correctly held against the plain-
tiff because the claim had been raised for the first time in the appeal and
had never been presented to the trial court.
Recognition of the incorporation of state and federal statutes in every
nursing home contract would provide a resident, regardless of the wording
of her contract, a basis for a bad faith breach of contract action, thus
allowing the individual resident maximum benefit from the statutes
passed to protect her.
D. Federal Statutes
As stated, the same rationale as described above can be applied to the
federal regulations and would be especially useful in states which have
no nursing home Bill of Rights. A second line of argument based upon
101 The rationale behind the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability
theory is remarkably similar to that given for bad faith breach of contract. In
Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d. 202 (Vt. 1984), the court stated that "[c]onfronted
with a recognized shortage of safe decent housing today's tenant is in an inferior
bargaining position compared to that of the landlord. Tenants vying for the limited
housing are 'virtually powerless to compel the performance of essential services."'
(cites omitted) Id. at 207. In determining the standard for breach of the implied
warranty, the court looked to the provisions of the housing code as a beginning,
but beyond this looked to see whether the claimed defect had "an impact on the
safety or health of the tenant." Id. at 209.
The court saw fit to extend the general damages to include damages for dis-
comfort and annoyance based upon the nature of the contract and the frequency
with which these types of injuries occur in this context. Id. The court thus imparted
the foreseeability of this type of injury onto the landlord.
The court further authorized the awarding of punitive damages where the
breach was carried out "by conduct manifesting.., a reckless or wanton disregard
of [the plaintiff's] rights." Id. at 210. This language closely parallels that found
in Comunale and in Owen's explication of intent in bad faith breach.
It is also noteworthy that most jurisdictions, including the court cited above,
have held that the implied warranty of habitability cannot be waived. Analogizing
to the nursing home contract, this would render most of the exculpatory clauses
in such contracts ineffective.
101443 So.2d 107 (Fla. App 1983).
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third party standing has been developed in suits based on the federal
regulations. This same argument could be equally applied to state reg-
ulations which prohibit a private right of action.
In Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc.,"1' the district court, although denying the
resident a private right of action under the federal statutes,"' held that
the resident, as an intended beneficiary of the contract between the state
and the nursing home, could sue the home as a third party beneficiary
for breach of contract. 112 In the medicaid program, the state distributes
federal funds to nursing homes in exchange for their agreement to provide
care according to the federal conditions of participation. The resident is
the intended beneficiary of this agreement and can thus maintain an
action.
A similar result was found in Euresti v. Steiner"3 where a group of
indigents sued a hospital for failure to provide low cost health care, as
required under their participation in the federal Hill-Burton program.
Thus, even if the theory of the direct incorporation of the federal regu-
lations into the nursing home resident contract fails, a resident can sue
for breach of contract as a third party beneficiary. The question then,
however, is can she sue for the tort of bad faith breach of contract as a
third party beneficiary?
VII. THIRD PARTIES AND BAD FArrH BREACH
For the answer to this question we must turn once again to insurance
law. The court in Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co." 4 implied that in the proper
situation a bad faith breach of contract action could be maintained by an
appropriate third party. The facts of that case involved an injured party
who sued for breach of the insurance company's good faith duty to settle
within the limits of the policy. The court held that the injured party could
not maintain such a suit because the covenant of good faith extended
only to third parties who were intended to benefit from the contract.
:1 461 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
"'Id. at 696.
"' Id. at 697. The court stated:
It is apparent from the language of this regulation that it is intended to
inure to the benefit of Medicaid patients receiving services in long term
care facilities participating in Title XIX through the Ohio state plan. Ohio
law has long recognized that 'a third person for whose benefit a promise
has been made by another may maintain an action thereon at law in his
own name'. The State of Ohio having elected to participate under Title XIX
and to receive federal funds, is obligated to provide medicaid service to
qualified recipients in a manner consistent with federal law. Defendant
Manor Care's obligations under state and federal law and regulations are
contractual. Insofar as the provisions of the federal regulations ... reflect
a duty owed to Ohio Medicaid patients by the state and the participating
providers of their care ... such recipients may maintain an action under a
provider's agreement in accordance with the law of Ohio. (cites omitted) Id.
:3 458 F.2d 1115 (Colo. 1972).
14 533 P.2d 172 (Cal. 1976).
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In Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group,"5 an action
was brought by an excess liability insurer to recover money it was re-
quired to pay out on a wrongful death action. The plaintiff alleged that
its losses were due to the primary insurer's bad faith refusal to settle
within the limits of the policy. The accident involved a permissive user
of an automobile insured under an omnibus clause of the insured's policy.
In finding for the plaintiff, the court held that "the right of a third party
beneficiary to enforce the contract extends to implied covenants."
The right of a third party to bring a bad faith breach of contract action
would seem to depend upon whether that party was an intended bene-
ficiary of the contract. There can be little doubt that the resident is the
intended beneficiary of the federal nursing home regulations. Thus, it
would seem that a third party beneficiary action for bad faith breach of
contract is an option for the nursing home resident.
VIII. DAMAGES
A. Consequential Damages
To understand the theoretical rationale of consequential damages in
bad faith breach of contract suits, it is easiest to approach the issue from
the contract perspective. A standard measure of contract damages is a
realization by the injured party of his expectation interest. Expectation
interest is defined by the Restatement 17 as "his interest in having the
benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have
been in had the contract been performed." This standard is relatively easy
to apply in commercial contracts where profits and losses tend to be liquid.
However, the nursing home resident benefits in lifestyle. Her losses are
physical and mental rather than pecuniary. The only method our system
has of placing a value on physical and mental injuries is that used in tort
cases to determine consequential damages. Bad faith breach as a com-
posite of tort and contract merely uses the tort valuation system to de-
termine the amount of traditional contract damages for non-traditional
contracts.
The first element of the tort as outlined would address this issue of
consequential damages. It would seem logical that a contract not made
for commercial gain would have a noncommercial expectation interest.
This interest also could not logically be realized using a commercial stand-
ard. The end remedy, however, placing the injured party in the position
he would have been in had the contractual promise been kept, is derived
from pure contract theory.
As previously mentioned, even expectation interest in contract reme-
dies is traditionally governed by the rule that recovery is limited to those
"1 143 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1978).
"' Id. at 421.
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS . 344 (1979).
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damages which were within the contemplation of the parties at the time
of the formation of the contract.118 The justification for ascribing to the
nursing home the foreseeability of the type of damage that can result is
found in the second element of the tort. Because the resident is forced
into the position of relying upon the supposed superior judgment of the
home for the bulk of her daily decisions, it would seem fair to ascribe to
that superior judgment a knowledge of the consequences that could befall
the resident as a result of the nursing home's decisions.
B. Punitive Damages
Typically, punitive damages are unavailable in either contract or neg-
ligence actions. A breach of contract is traditionally seen as a morally
neutral act. In an economic world, overall efficiency is best served if a
party is free to commit an economically favorable breach as long as he
is willing to make the injured party whole. 119 Breach in this context may
actually be a socially desirable action.
Negligence, although it claims to be based on fault, also adopts a mor-
ally neutral standpoint. Intent is irrelevant. Accidents are seen as in-
evitable events. The focus in negligence is on the meeting of an objective
standard of reasonable care and an allocation of losses. Those who fail to
meet the standard must absorb the loss.
To justify punitive damages, there must be some act which elicits moral
approbation. 120 In bad faith breach, that moral approbation finds its source
in the second element of the tort: a violation of the special relationship
based on the trust the weaker party must place in the stronger to act in
her best interest. This trust is the source of the quasi-public nature which
characterizes the contracts to which bad faith breach has been applied.
But as John'2 ' points out, a rationale to justify punitive damages is not
enough. There must be some standard to guide courts in the awarding of
these damages. This is provided by the third element of the tort. The
defendant's actions must be scrutinized to identify a pattern of conduct
which he knew or should have known would systematically frustrate the
plaintiff's enjoyment of the benefits due her. Punitive damages would
only be allowed in those cases where the plaintiff was able to prove the
systematic conduct of the defendant in depriving her of the benefit of her
bargain. The amount of punitive damages would be determined by the
seriousness of the objectionable behavior. This serves the plaintiff on the
one hand by taking the focus off any single incident in isolation and
allows her a remedy for a series of events no one of which can be proven
to have proximately caused her injury. On the other hand, it protects the
defendant from having a simple act of negligence converted into an action
for punitive damages.
Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rptr. 145 (1854).
119 Gilmore, supra note 52, at 14-16.
120 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS. D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 9 (5th ed.
1984).
121 John, supra note 47, at 2036.
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IX. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Whether or not a nursing home resident can take advantage of the
longer statute of limitations generally available for contract actions when
bringing a bad faith breach of contract suit very much depends on the
jurisdiction in which she resides. Since a bad faith breach of contract
arises from both tort and contract, which statute of limitations applies?
In some states such as Ohio, only the tort form of the action is recognized
and thus the tort statute of limitations applies.12 2 In other states such as
New York, the action is recognized as arising out of contract and the
contract statute of limitations applies. 123 In California, where the majority
of bad faith breach of contract actions have been decided, the courts appear
divided.
In Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,' 24 the court held that the plaintiff
may elect between a contract theory or a tort theory. If the contract theory
is elected then she may use the longer statute of limitations but is barred
from claiming punitive damages (the court did, however, award damages
for emotional distress under the contract theory). 25 In Umann v. Excess
Ins. Co., 126 however, the first district court of appeals found that the action
arose both in contract and tort and expressly rejected the election theory
presented in Frazier. The Umann court stated that, regardless of theory,
the plaintiff had to prove the same set of facts, the defendant had available
the same defenses, and the jury received the same instructions. It would
not be logical, the court reasoned, to allow punitive damages if the action
is brought within two years but deny them if it is brought within four
years. 27
Two months later the second district court of appeals, in Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. L.A. County, 24 expressly rejected the holding in Umann
and returned to the Frazer standard of election of theory. It is noteworthy
that both cases were denied review within a month of one another. The
law in California is thus unclear.
X. CONCLUSION
The number of suits brought by nursing home residents has been few,
and the awards the residents have received have been small. Despite
extensive federal and state regulation over the past fifteen years, nursing
122 Wolfe v. Continental Casualty Co., 647 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1981).
1"' Roldan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
124 214 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1985).
125 Id. at 891-892.
126 236 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1987), rev. denied and ordered not to be officially published
(July 1987).
121 Id. at 95-96.
128 237 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1987), rev. denied and ordered not to be officially pub-
lished (Aug. 1987).
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home abuse continues. This results in a large number of insured indi-
viduals who have been unable or unwilling to obtain redress for their
injuries. A significant part of the problem is the cause of action tradi-
tionally available to the residents - negligence. Negligence simply does
not adequately address the type of institutionalized systematic abuse
found in nursing homes.
The tort of bad faith breach of contract has been successfully applied
to correct corporate abuse in the insurance industry since 1958.129 The
criteria for application of the tort, as described by Louderback and Ju-
rika,130 seem to fit the nursing home-resident contractual relationship
very well.
As there has been much confusion among the various jurisdictions as
to the standard for bad faith breach, an attempt has been made herein
to set out elements for the tort and demonstrate how they would apply
to the nursing home contract.
In addition to allowing greater damages, the bad faith breach of contract
action has the advantage for the nursing home plaintiff of pinpointing
the type of conduct which characteristically results in nursing home
abuse, specifically corporate oppression.
Although it is yet untried, bad faith breach of contract should prove
an effective and powerful weapon for the nursing home resident.
CHARLEs A. LATVANZI
129 Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
"' See supra note 36.
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